Internal Relations and the Possibility of Evil by Shuster, Martin
 




Internal Relations and the Possibility of Evil










Martin Shuster, « Internal Relations and the Possibility of Evil », European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy [Online], II-2 | 2010, Online since 21 December 2010, connection on 23 April 2019.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/901  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.901 
This text was automatically generated on 23 April 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Internal Relations and the
Possibility of Evil




1 In a suggestive and seemingly commonplace claim Cavell points out that “mere morality
is not designed to evaluate the behavior and interactions of monsters” (CR 265).1 I say
suggestive and commonplace because such a thought recurs at crucial points in The Claim
of Reason. Indeed, ultimately, Cavell writes in a parenthetical that:
To  understand  Nazism,  whatever  that  will  mean,  will  be  to  understand  it  as  a
human  possibility;  monstrous,  unforgiveable,  but  not  therefore  the  conduct  of
monsters. Monsters are not unforgiveable, and not forgiveable. We do not bear the
right internal relation to them for forgiveness to apply. (CR 378)
2 Now,  as  far  as  I  can tell  this  line of  thinking raises  two distinct  questions,  the first
lexicographic,  the  other  theoretical.  Starting  with  the  former,  it  is  important  to
understand what Cavell means by “internal relation.” On the point of the latter, there is
the age-old, perhaps even tired question about the nature of evil. Roughly, the question
centers on whether we take evil to be a distinct something (e.g. a malum metaphysicum) or
whether we take it to be a lack or privation of something (i.e. a nothing) like “the good,” or
more neutrally, e.g., existence.2 To return to the prior point about internal relations, I
think it is especially significant to take stock of this term and its connection to Cavell’s
moral perfectionism because it allows us to see that the notion of internal relations is not
something that Cavell simply tacks onto his moral perfectionism, but rather the notion of
internal relations fundamentally expressed his moral perfectionism.
3 Ultimately, my argument here will be that not only does (1) Cavell’s moral perfectionism
present a more interesting (or perhaps even novel) answer to the question of evil, but
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that it does so by (2) fundamentally undermining the basis through which the question of
whether evil is a privation or a positive force or object can arise in the first place.
 
II. Internal Relations
4 We can begin to elaborate these points by making sense of what Cavell means by “internal
relation.” This term occurs seven times in the Claim. I quote all but one of them here:3
What he [a conservative in a debate about abortion] wants is for the embryo to be
seen as a human being: he wants the internal relation between human embryos and
human beings to strike you. (CR 373)
He  [the  slave-owner]  is  rather  missing  something  about  himself,  or  rather
something about his connection with these people, his internal relation with them,
so to speak. (CR 376)
He [again, the slave-owner] means, indefinitely, that there are kinds of humans. (It
is, I take it, to deny just this that Marx […] speaks of man as a species-being. To be
human is to be one of humankind, to bear an internal relation to all others). (CR
376)
Whether I am struck by likeness or difference, however, the basis of the surprise is
the  stability  of  the  human  frame,  as  it  were,  under  countless  inflections  –  the
internal relation between each body and each other. (CR 395)
The logical space is so vast between kinds of objects […] Whereas human beings, by
contrast, are all alike; each bears an internal relation to all others. (CR 442)
You do not claim […] to go around every day in roughly Othello’s frame of mind? –
Not exactly. But I claim to see how his life figures mine, how mine has the makings
of his, that we bear an internal relation to one another; how my happiness depends
upon living touched but not struck by his problems […]. (CR 453)
5 Now, the employment of this term here is initially puzzling. As G. E. Moore had pointed
out roughly sixty years prior with his attack on Bradley, “it is by no means easy to make
out”  what  may be meant  by the notion of  an internal  relation.4 Of  course,  ‘internal
relations’  have  an  elaborate,  perhaps  even  sordid,  philosophical  history.  Most
prominently, I am thinking exactly of the aforementioned revolt by Russell and Moore
against Bradley and Green on the point of internal relations.5 To best understand Cavell’s
employment of internal relations, however, I think we can focus on Wittgenstein’s use of
the term in reaction to Russell’s and Moore’s use of it. Indeed, given Cavell’s relationship
to  Wittgenstein,  I  don’t  think  it  is  implausible  to  suggest  that  the  Wittgensteinian
heritage is the one most relevant.
6 Dropping our anchor here, however, proves not to be entirely easy, since Wittgenstein
uses the notion as early as the Tractatus and recent Wittgenstein interpretation has been
divided on how to understand Wittgenstein on the notion of internal relations in the
Tractatus.6 Without  entering  into  this  debate,  I  do  want  to  pick  out  one  striking
formulation from the Tractatus. There, Wittgenstein writes that:
4.123: A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it
(This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation of lighter to
darker. It is unthinkable that these two objects should not stand in this relation).7
7 Skipping to Wittgenstein’s later work, the term ‘internal relation’ occurs only once in the
Investigations; there Wittgenstein writes:
The colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object (this
blotting paper looks pink to me, and is pink) – the shape of the visual impression to
the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me, and is rectangular) – but what I
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perceive in the dawning of an aspect (Aspekt) is not a property of the object, but an
internal relation between it and other objects.8
8 On the next page, Wittgenstein points out:
The concept of an aspect is akin (verwandt) to the concept of an image (Vorstellung)
[…] Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will (Wille). There is such an
order as “Imagine this,” and also: “Now see the figure like this”; but not: “Now see
this leaf green.”9
9 We can see from these quotations that there is a certain continuity in Wittgenstein’s
understanding of internal relations – at least on this point – namely that the notion of
internal relations, at least as far as it can best be illustrated, is always closely linked to the
perception of colors. An internal relation is understood in such a way that in order to
understand one concept (e.g. red), I must understand another (e.g. pink), and vice versa.
 
III. Forms of Life
10 A  particular  sort  of  holism  (perhaps  even  idealism)  is  certainly  what  underwrites
Wittgenstein’s later thinking on the matter (and this later thought is the one that carries
the  most  significance  for  Cavell).  This  Wittgensteinian  backdrop,  although  a  sort  of
holism, is not however, at least on the point of internal relations, one that succumbs to
the criticisms that Russell launched against Bradley’s holistic idealism. Russell had argued
that a doctrine of internal relations commits one to holding “that every relation is really
constituted by the natures of the terms or of the whole which they compose, or merely
that every relation has a ground in these natures.”10
11 Wittgenstein’s point – certainly by the time of the Investigations – is  that the picture
behind Russell’s critique is one that itself must be abandoned. It is not that there is some
ontological  whole  that  stands  behind  relations  constituting  or  grounding  them  (i.e.
Bradley, on Russell’s view), nor is it the case that relations are entirely contingent (as
Russell’s doctrine of external relations argued). Rather, the picture that makes either of
these positions plausible  is  itself  precisely  undermined by Wittgenstein’s  entire  later
philosophical  outlook.  While  relations  are  ultimately  conceptual,  our  concepts  are
neither defined solely by something like an outside (e.g. reality), nor solely by something
like an inside (e.g. mind), nor even by some relation between the two.11 Instead, as Cavell
points out, for Wittgenstein, the “gap between mind and world is closed, or the distortion
between them straightened,  in  the appreciation and acceptance of  particular  human
forms of life, human ‘convention’” (CR 109). To begin to understand this point, we can
remind ourselves that Wittgenstein claims that: “An internal relation is never a relation
between two objects,  but  you  might  call  it  a  relation  between two concepts.  And a
sentence asserting an internal  relation between two objects,  such as  a  mathematical
sentence, is not describing objects but constructing concepts.”12 Concept construction, in
turn, according to Wittgenstein, is not something that occurs merely in reaction to some
“external” reality, nor merely by some “frictionless spinning in a void.”13 Our concepts
owe themselves to our forms of life.14 (As Wittgenstein puts the point: “The person who
cannot play this game does not have this concept.”15)
12 To return to the discussion of an aspect, we can get a better grasp on what Wittgenstein’s
notion of internal relations may signify for Cavell by asking what it would mean to have
‘aspect  blindness,’  to  have  an  ignorance  of  an  internal  relation.  On  this  point,
Wittgenstein proposes that we could indeed imagine someone having a sort of “aspect
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blindness”:  “The  question  now  arises:  Could  there  be  human  beings  lacking  in  the
capacity to see something as something – and what would that be like?”16 Framed in this
way, it is explicit that this entire Wittgensteinian theme is meant to connect to Cavell’s
discussion of “soul-blindness” (CR 378 – a point Cavell himself makes on CR 355).
13 In elaborating ‘aspect blindness,’  Wittgenstein points out that “the ‘aspect-blind’  will
have an altogether different relationship to pictures from ours.”17 In turn, Wittgenstein
draws an analogy between having a ‘musical ear’ and aspect blindness. He asks us to
imagine what it means to ‘experience’ words. What I take Wittgenstein to be after with
these suggestions is that ‘aspect-blindness’  is,  as he states, in part,  subject to the will
(albeit with an important caveat to the notion of will, elaborated below): I can take this
picture as a picture of this or of that (e.g. the duck or the rabbit), but my will is also
subject to the form of life that I inhabit (e.g. if I have no notion of a duck because no such
creatures exist, then that aspect is unavailable to me). As Wittgenstein will state at the
end of this discussion: “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of
life.”18
14 Before getting a grip on how forms of life is being employed here, and before returning to
Cavell,  it  is important to highlight several characteristics of ‘soul-blindness’  over and
beyond ‘aspect-blindness.’ Most fundamentally, Wittgenstein points out that: “‘I cannot
know what is going on in him’ is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a
conviction.  It  does  not  give  the  reasons  for  the  conviction.  They  are  not  readily
accessible.”19 The point, as far as Cavell is concerned (i.e. as far as Cavell’s Wittgenstein is
concerned), is that in the case of ‘soul-blindness’ it is simply not possible, as an agent, for
me to lack others, to be entirely alone. I take this point to be, at least in part, another
consequence  of  the  way  in  which  Cavell  interprets  Wittgenstein’s  private  language
argument. Cavell writes:
I think one moral of the Investigations as a whole can be drawn as follows: The fact,
and the state, of your (inner) life cannot take its importance from anything special
in it. However far you have gone with it, you will find that what is common is there
before you are. The state of your life may be, and may be all that is, worth your
infinite interest.  But then that can only exist  along with a complete disinterest
toward it. The soul is impersonal. (CR 361)
15 My own self is intimately dependent on others: it is in this sense that Cavell means the
“soul is impersonal.” Not impersonal in the sense that it is not mine, but impersonal in the
sense that it can only belong to me in and through a relation to others. More specifically,
the argument here and elsewhere is that, through and through, my innermost private
thoughts and moments are always already inflected through and saturated by language,
namely a language that is always fundamentally inherited (perhaps even stolen, as Cavell
proposes in places). There is and can be nothing of, in, or through the self that is not in
this  way  configured:  privacy  is  itself  always  a  function  of  the  common  heritage  of
language and thereby our relation not only to language, but to others (whether overtly in
the form of word projection and its success and/or failure or covertly in the contours of
our  world.)  So,  where in the case  of  ‘aspect  blindness,’  it  is  possible  to  lack certain
particulars, it is impossible in the case of ‘soul blindness’ to lack particular others.
16 Such  an  argument  about  language,  ourselves,  and  others,  however,  raises  all  of  the
various complex questions about how to conceive of  such a relation and how such a
relation (as much to language as to others) works (and fails to work), both philosophically
and in lived experience.20 The answers to such questions are, at least in rubric, found in
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Cavell’s elaboration of Wittgenstein’s notion of a form of life. Who I am is defined as much
by  the  various  social  claims,  motivations,  and  influences  (among  other  things)  that
congeal into what Wittgenstein calls a “practice,”21 as it is defined by who I take myself to
be in response to such practices. In turn, these practices are more than mere agreements
within a community or individual interpretations,22 they are something we are already
always  engaged  in,  immersed  in,  and  in  the  midst  of.  Agreement  is  already  always
continually  negotiated,  perhaps  and  often  at  levels  too  complex  to  perceive,  while
interpretation itself cannot exist outside of the practices of a community: it is also already
always dependent on our practices. We can think here precisely of what Cavell had in an
earlier essay called the “whirl of organism.”23 Not only are these practices constantly
shifting in  the  ways  in  which  we  do  and  do  not  negotiate  our  linguistic  and  social
boundaries, but they are impacted as much by simple brute facts like that we will die, we
require food, we have sex, we excrete, we need to breathe, we get sick, and so forth.24
17 There is, then, a seamless interpenetration between our particular surroundings and the
ways in which we see the things in and of those surroundings. Wittgenstein is explicit
about this point when he writes that: “Something is ‘grey’ or ‘white’ only in a particular
surrounding (Umgebung).”25 In turn, forms of life, surroundings, and our practices are all
mutually implicated within one another. A forceful example is presented in §250 of the
Investigations, when Wittgenstein asks:
Why can’t a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest? Could one teach a dog to simulate
pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach him to howl on particular occasions as if he
were in pain, even when he is not. But the surroundings which are necessary for
this behaviour to be real simulation are missing.26
18 Our surroundings, our forms of life, indeed we (i.e. I) require an other.27 According to
Cavell, someone who is ‘soul-blind’ wants to deny or overlook this aspect of herself. She
willfully proposes a picture of herself that excludes the other, that promotes a fantasy of
radical independence. Or, she is incapable of seeing a picture in which the other appears.
This is what I take Cavell to mean when he writes that:
The block to my vision of the other is not the other’s body but my incapacity or
unwillingness to interpret or to judge it accurately, to draw the right connections.
The suggestion is: I suffer a kind of blindness, but I avoid the issue by projecting
this darkness upon the other […] Aspect-blindness is something in me failing to
dawn. (CR 368-369)
19 Cavell continues, drawing the aforementioned connection to the duck-rabbit, by pointing
out that: “We may say that the rabbit-aspect is hidden from us when we fail to see it. But
what hides it is then obviously not the picture (that reveals it), but our (prior) way of
taking it, namely in its duck-aspect” (CR 369). Cavell’s point is that in the case of ‘soul-
blindness’ it is impossible, unless one has actively willed it (and this must be qualified in a
very important way shortly), for an other or others to be missing (as opposed to, e.g., in
the case where a duck-aspect may be missing in a world without ducks – i.e., in a world
without the obvious possibility of a duck aspect). The point is that I am who I am always
only in relation to an other (whereas I could easily be who I am in a world that lacked
ducks or rabbits, or even both). One explicit moment (among countless others) where
Cavell makes this point is when he writes:
I  do  not  know  in  advance  how  deep  my  agreement  with  myself  is,  how  far
responsibility for the language may run. But if I am to have my own voice in it, I
must be speaking for others and allow others to speak for me. The alternative to
speaking for myself representatively (for someone else’s consent) is not: speaking for
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myself privately. The alternative is having nothing to say, being voiceless, not even
mute. (CR 28)
20 How to “cash out” this proposal (whether,  e.g.,  to understand it dialectically or non-
dialectically  or  how  to  understand  the  mechanics  and  nature  of  Cavellian
acknowledgment or the proposal of community and communal politics that it entails) is a
complex question that I simply cannot pursue here. The only point I want to stress is that
Cavell wants to invoke precisely the idea that who I am owes itself to my relation to an
other (again, at this point taken neither dialectically nor non-dialectically).28
21 Now, when I say that soul-blindness can only exist because of a process of will, whereas
aspect blindness can exist by a process of will or by the contingencies of affairs, I believe
that it is crucial to understand that will here is not some simple mechanism of choice.
Rather, owing to the picture of agency that I sketched above (that the notion of forms of
life  proposes),  the notion of  will  itself  begins to look radically different.  One way to
understand  this  point  is  to  grasp  that,  owing  to  the  saturation  between  inside  and
outside,  the relationship between our vision of the world and our choices within the
world becomes reconfigured. This is what I take to be the import of Wittgenstein’s point
that:  “Seeing an aspect  and imagining are subject  to will.  There is  such an order as
‘Imagine this,’ and also: ‘Now see the figure like this’; but not: ‘Now see this leaf green’.”29
Much in the same way that we do not have an option of seeing in color (unless we are
color-blind, in which case we do not have the option of seeing in black and white), so we
also do not have the option of being who we are without others. We can however (and
certainly,  oftentimes  unfortunately,  and  all-too-easily  do)  train  or  allow  ourselves
(whether intentionally or unconsciously, knowingly or unknowingly) to see not only a
duck instead of a rabbit, but a slave instead of a person, or an object instead of a subject.
The relationship between our vision and our moral commitments, then, is such that we
need not (indeed cannot) choose, theoretically, between a demurral to treat someone as
other than a slave owing to an incapability of seeing them as more than a slave and an
incapacity to see them as more than a slave owing to a demurral to treat them as more
than a slave. The two are one and the same. This is what Cavell means when he writes
that: “What he [the slave-owner] really believes is not that slaves are not human beings,
but that some human beings are slaves […] this man sees certain human beings as slaves,
takes  them for  slaves”  (CR 375).30 When Wittgenstein states  that  seeing an aspect  is
subject (unterstehen) to will, he has in mind not that our seeing of aspects is always a
matter of willing to see it a certain way, but only that it can so be subject, as the German
suggests, it can be subordinate to or under the control of our will.
22 The reason, among other things, that it may often be more difficult to change one’s view
(let alone someone else’s view) of someone from a slave to a non-slave is that such a
vision is always bound up with intricate and varied sets of other beliefs, ranging in scope
and weight from anything to religion (e.g.  manifest destiny or the Curse of  Ham) to
science (e.g. racial anthropology) to aesthetics (e.g. the “Caucasian” skull of Backenbach)
to politics  (e.g.  secessionism),  and so forth.  The vision between a duck and a rabbit,
although potentially subject to similar sorts of inputs is inflected differently, carrying a
different sort of importance and urgency (although it need not).31 This is what I take to be
the implied suggestion in a very a striking passage towards the end of The Claim of Reason:
Then I  might put the question “Is there such a thing as soul-blindness?” in the
following  way:  Is  this  [our  form  of  civilization]  […]  form  of  civilization  being
replaced by another? In particular, is it being replaced by one in which nothing that
happens any longer strikes us as the objectification of subjectivity, as the act of an
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answerable agent, as the expression and satisfaction of human freedom, of human
intention  and  desire?  What  has  a  beginning  can  have  an  end.  If  this  future
(civilization?)  were  effected  its  members  would  not  be  dissatisfied.  They  would
have lost the concept of satisfaction. Then nothing would (any longer) give them
the idea that living beings, human beings, could feel. So they would not (any longer)
be  human.  They  would  not,  for  example,  be  frightened  upon meeting  others  –
except in the sense, or under circumstances, in which they would be frightened
upon encountering bears or storms,  circumstances under which bears would be
frightened. And of course particular forms of laughter and of amazement would
also no longer be possible,  ones  which depend upon clear  breaks  between,  say,
machines and creatures (CR 468).
23 Cavell’s picture here is so striking because it precisely draws out the stakes of what it
would mean to see all  others as devoid of agency:  it  would ultimately involve seeing
ourselves as entirely devoid of agency; it shows the contours of what it would mean to
affirm radical  independence:  namely,  it  would  precisely  require  us  to  no  longer  see
ourselves as agents.32 To see all others as devoid of agency – truly to see such a thing –
would require us to abrogate a variety of other highlights and lowlights in our moral-
visual spectrum; indeed, it would require us to abrogate a particular view of ourselves. In
the same way, incapacity and refusal to see certain others as like me (or as truly human or
as more than a slave) merge together exactly because they are subject to countless other
inflections and inputs, both individual and communal. This is what Cavell has in mind
when he states that in seeing someone as a slave, the slave-owner can mean nothing
“definite” (CR 376). The slave-owner, rather, appeals to a whole form of life, and all that
such an appeal entails.
24 What I take Cavell to be implicitly stressing, then, when he writes that the slave-owner is
“rather missing something about himself, or rather something about his connection with
these people [slaves], his internal relation with them,” is that the slave-owner illustrates
the practical fragility of such internal relations and the theoretical complexity of how to
understand this practical vulnerability: the myriad ways in which we can and do ignore,
overlook, or devalue each other and the plethora of methods by which we attempt to
justify,  constitute,  or  fail  to  acknowledge  such projects  and  claims.  The  interest  (or
promise) that Cavell’s moral perfectionism holds for us is that it attempts to work within
the framework of such failures (whether of reasons or acknowledgment, of institutions or
individuals);  Cavell’s  moral  perfectionism  should  be  understood  as  the  means  of
navigating this fragility, not as a means of proposing it.33 This is what I take Cavell to
mean when he writes in the introductory remarks to Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome,
that “if there is a perfectionism not only compatible with democracy but necessary to it,
it lies not in excusing democracy for its inevitable failure, or looking to rise above them,
but in teaching how to respond to those failures,  and to one’s compromise by them,
otherwise than by excuse or withdrawal.”34
 
IV. Conclusion: Cavell and Evil
25 What significance, does this have for Cavell’s understanding of evil, or in Cavell’s terms,
monstrosity? When Cavell says that to understand Nazism would mean to understand it
as  a  “human possibility;  monstrous,  unforgiveable,  but  not  therefore  the  conduct of
monsters” and that we do not “bear the right internal relation” to monsters, I believe he
has in mind the idea that monstrosity or pure evil would not – indeed could not – be a part
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our form of life (CR 378). In making this argument for Cavell, I do not intend to suggest
that Cavell would (or that we should) deny the existence of evil or evils, as he makes clear
in the quote above (Nazism is monstrous), rather the denial is of evil as anything over and
beyond a human possibility (i.e. pure evil or evil as a distinct, metaphysical force). On this
argument, evils are always embedded in particular forms of life and thereby they are
always anchored to fundamentally human, fundamentally understandable motives. This
is not to say, of course, that we can always and immediately understand such motives –
no more than we can understand any other particular motives. It is often the case that
our own motives, or the motives of others may be unavailable to us, whether because of a
fundamental insensitivity to their origins or grounds or because of their complexity, or
because of a variety of other possible factors. The only point I want to stress here is that
potentially they are always available in the sense that they only exist through a complex
framework of forms of life: of various materially saturated norms that themselves are
interlaced with conceptions of good and evil, of human and inhuman, of monstrous and
angelic, and so forth.35
26 When Cavell states that, “mere morality is not designed to evaluate the behavior and
interactions of monsters,” he should be understood as making the same point that Hegel
makes in his Lectures on Aesthetics. There, Hegel writes that: “evil in the abstract has no
truth in itself and is of no interest.”36 Contra Schelling and those would view evil as some
sort of cosmic force, Hegel wants to argue that evil is really always a particular evil,37
embedded in a particular shape of spirit (indeed, it would not be too much to say “form of
life” here),38 and answering to,  evaluated by,  and existing through a robust  spiritual
(geistige) backdrop. In this sense, to speak of evil as such would be akin to describing the
act of a Hutu interhamawe or Khmer Rouge perpetrator of genocide as a force of nature:
inscrutable,  malevolent,  and utterly  inhuman.  It  would be  precisely  the  picture  that
Cavell sketched above: where such things would no longer strike us as “the objectification
of  subjectivity.”  Indeed,  they  would  ultimately  be  actions  no  longer  attributable  to
subjects (in the same way that earthquakes or other natural disasters are not attributable
to subjects), not because they are inhuman, but because they are not human.39 Cavell’s
moral perfectionism, then, on one hand, shares with privation theories of evil the idea
that evil is not some cosmic force standing over and beyond or apart from our forms of
life. On the other hand, in opposition to such privation theories, it does posit evil as a
genuine opposition to the good, but it is an opposition that is itself always staked, judged,
delineated, and negotiated in light of a particular, concrete form of life. In short, then,
evil has a genuine existence, but it is one that is perpetually responsive to our “whirl of
organism” and which must be evaluated by a process that is somewhere between “natural
science” and “natural history.”40
27 To conclude,  I  want briefly to acknowledge that all of this is not to say that various
perpetrators through the course of history have not desired or aspired to see themselves
as precisely not human (whether as more than human or fundamentally as a force of
nature, but in either case, here opposed to inhuman). Indeed, Hannah Arendt famously
argued that (at least some, if not many of) the perpetrators of the Nazi genocide saw
themselves as superfluous as their victims. As she wrote in Origins of Totalitarianism: “The
manipulators of this system believe in their own superfluousness as much as in that of all
others, and the totalitarian murderers are all the more dangerous because they do not
care if they themselves are alive or dead, if they ever lived or never were born.”41 I would
take  Cavell  to  be  quite  sympathetic  to  Arendt’s  line  of  argument,42 with  the
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understanding  that  this  fantasy  of  superfluousness  must  always  be  understood as  a
human possibility, one with a distinct historical axis, whether ideological, material, or
some combination of these or a host of others, others which are and, again, can only be
human, all-too-human.
28 Indeed, Cavell’s moral perfectionism precisely bars the means by which the question of
whether evil is a privation or a positive force tends to arise in the first place. Evil on such
a view, is a human possibility, akin to justice or vengeance or respect: it is a sort of claim 
that we make to, for, and perhaps in opposition to others. It is, then, like a variety of
other sorts of claims: a claim to reason and part of the search for reason. On such a
proposal, then, seeing it as a privation looks especially useless, since it no more makes
sense to see evil as a privation than it does to see any of our other claims as a privation.
(A privation of what? The only privation that could exist on such a picture would be the
empty, hollow silence of the lack of agency that Cavell describes.) Similarly, seeing it as a
positive  object  also makes  no more sense than seeing any other  claims as  distinctly
positive. (It is no more and no less a positive object than the object of any other claim:
always open to revision and negotiated by our forms of life.) Either picture would be a
picture that would present ourselves to ourselves as more than human; it would somehow
erase the fact of our humanity, our finitude, by making us either too evil or not evil
enough.
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ABSTRACTS
In this article, I examine Cavell’s understanding and deployment of the categories of ‘evil’ and
the ‘monstrous’ in The Claim of Reason. Arguing that these notions cannot be understood apart
from  Cavell’s  reliance  on  the  notion  of  an  ‘internal  relation,’  I  trace  this  notion  to  its
Wittgensteinian roots. Ultimately, I show that Cavell’s view of evil allows us to navigate between
two horns  of  a  classic  dilemma in  thinking  about  evil:  it  allows  us  to  see  evil  as  neither  a
privation nor as a positive force with supra-human potency.
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